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STATE OF UTAH 
RENNOLD PENDER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
ELLis I. .._~DERSON and EvA ANDERSON, 
his wife, BERT CENTER and JANE 
DoE CENTER, whose true name is 
unknown, his wife, ALLIANCE REAL-
TY & BuiLDING Co., a corporation, 
also all other persons unknown 
claiming any right, title, estate or 
interest in or lien upon the real 
property described in the complaint 
adverse to plaintiff's ownership or 
clouding plaintiff's title, thereto, 
Defenda;nts and Respondents. 
Case No. 7638 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This was an action to quiet the title to certain Salt 
Lake County realty, brought by plaintiff ·and appellant, 
Rennold Pender (Rec. 1-3), as assignee of Dr. G. Mur-
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ray Edwards (Rec. 34, 87-88, Ex. "A"), to rescind as 
fraudulent a deed to defendant and respondent Bert 
Center, and to set aside a tax title acquired by defendant 
and respondent Alliance Realty and Building Company 
(Rec. 31-32, Ex. "A", Entries 5, 9, 11), as being based 
on an invalid tax sale ( Rec. 44-45, 77). 
It appeared that Dr. G. Murray Edwards, a resident 
of Denver, Colorado, acquired title to Lots 11, 12, 13, 
Block 1, Davis, Sharp & Stringers Addition to Salt Lake 
City, Salt Lake County, Utah, by deed dated February 
17, 1915, recorded February 23, 1917 (Rec. 31, 86, Ex. 
"A", Entry 1). ~fr. Edwards was a physician, and had 
as a patient over the period of the years 1929-1935, one 
Bert Center (Rec. 86, 95 ), with whom he became very 
friendly (Rec. 100-101). Dr. Edwards, being desirous 
of disposing of the above lots, mentioned the matter to 
Mr. Center, who was planning on going west, and who of-
fered to try to make a sale or disposition of them for the 
doctor (Rec. 86), and obtained from the latter a deed to 
enable him to deal with the ground, said deed being dated 
June 10, 1935, and recorded by Mr. Center June 14, 
1935 (Rec. 86, 96-97, Ex. "A", Entry 6; Ex. 5). Ac-
cording to Dr. Edwards, the deed was executed to en-
able Mr. Center to make a sale or disposition of the lots, 
and not otherwise, and upon ~any sale, Mr. Center was to 
remit the proceeds, and receive a commission (Rec. 87-
88), and Dr. Edwards, relying upon the representations 
of Mr. Center would not have executed or delivered the 
instrument in question except upon the premises that 
the ground was to be sold and that he was to receive the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
proceeds. X o n10ney or other fonn of consideration was 
paid or giYen for the deed (Rec. 87) and Bert Center, 
himself, adn1its (Rec. 100), there was no contempo-
raneous transfer or payment of cash or other considera-
tion giYen for the deed at the time of the delivery of same 
to him, but, contrary to the doctor's testimony, claiins 
that the deed was given to him as compensation for serv-
ices previously rendered gratuitously for Dr. Edwards 
in looking up the status of some oil leases or oil stock 
in Tex<as, which services were performed with no thought 
of charging therefor at the time they were accomplished. 
Taxes were not paid by either the doctor or Mr. Center, 
and the lots in question were sold to Salt Lake County 
for delinquent taxes on a four year s·ale under date of 
~larch 18th, 1936 (Rec. 32, Ex. "A", Entry 7), and 
thereafter. defendant-respondent Ellis I. Anderson ac-
quired the tax title from Salt Lake County under date 
of April lOth, 1946 (Entry 9, Exhibit "A", Rec. 32), 
and later, joined by his wife, the defendant-respondent, 
Eva P. Anderson, conveyed this tax title to defendant-re-
spondent Alliance Realty and Building Company, on 
August 6, 1947 (Rec. 33, Exhibit "A", Entry No. 11). 
Dr. Edwards, joined by his wife Nella Edwards, deeded 
his interest in the ground to Rennold Pender, (Rec. 32, 
Exhibit "A", Entry 8), and executed an assignment of 
his cause of action to rescind against Bert Center to 
plaintiff-~appellant Pender (Rec. 34, 88, Ex. "A", last 
entry). Thereupon this action was commenced (Rec. 
1-3), and proceedings entering default of Bert Center and 
the Andersons were had (Rec. 21-22). Later, Dr. Ed-
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ward's deposition was taken, when the attorney for Al-
liance Realty and Building Company located Bert Center, 
had his default set aside (Rec. 69-80, 85), entered ao 
appearance for him, and engineered an arrangement to 
give defendant-respondent Center a fifth interest in the 
ground, if the latter would go along with the defendant, 
Alliance Realty and Building Company (Rec. 79, 102, 
106, Ex. "C "). The cause proceeded to trial on docu--
mentary evidence of title, and the respective depositions 
of Dr. G. Murray Edwards (Rec. 86-89, Ex. "B"), and 
Bert Center (Rec. 94-107). The Court, having heard 
the evidence, indicated that if it believed the plaintiff's 
case as exemplified by the testimony of Dr. Edward8, 
it would be constrained to set aside the deed to Center, 
and find for the pl,aintiff-appellant; but, instead of so 
doing and deciding on the merits, ruled that plaintiff 
had not produced enough evidence to sustain the burden 
of proof, and gave judgment of dismissal in favor of 
defendants (Rec. 109, 15-16). From this judgment and 
decree, and the denial of a motion for a new trial, pl,ain-
tiff-appellant prosecutes this appeal (Rec. 114.). 
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ARGU~IENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DE-
CIDE THE ISSUE OF FRAUD ON THE MERITS OF THE 
CASE, RATHER THAN PREDICATING ITS DECISION ON 
LACK OF BURDEN OF PROOF. 
(A) The facts are clear, convincing, and decisive. 
The facts in this case are not complicated. They 
·are simple, direct, and convincing. It is clear that the 
defendant Center obtained a deed in his favor (or in 
blank, in which his name was later inserted) to enable 
him to deal with the lots described as belonging to Dr. 
Edwards. It is clear that no value was paid, or no other 
consideration 'vas given to procure the delivery of the 
deed-and, this is beyond all doubt definitely and de-
cisively admitted by the defendant Center. It is clear 
that Dr. Edwards would not have parted with his title, 
except on reliance of the representations that defendant 
Center might be able to turn a deal on the lots, remit 
the purchase price, and earn a commission. It is clear 
that a mutual relationship covering business, personal, 
and medical matters had existed between the parties 
over a period of years, and that there was a display of 
confidence by each in the actions of the other. Dr. Ed-
ward's testimony is clear that he did not intend to make 
a gift to Center of the ground, and, it is clear that no 
monetary obligation existed on his part to Center. It 
is clear that greater credence to the sale theory must be 
given, in view of the fact that Center admitted he had 
dealt in real estate in small way-undoubtedly the doe-
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tor was, in view of their friendly relationship endeavor-
ing to give him some business. It is clear that Ce~ter 
planned to leave Denver, although he apparently never 
intended to come to Salt Lake City. Even after reco:r:ding 
the deed to himself Center never manifested any interest 
in the lots, never paid any taxes thereon, never entered 
into possession-all that is clear. :Manifestly Center's 
clain1 that the conveyance of the lots was the gift of the 
doctor for past services, is the flimsiest sort of pretex 
for claiming title. The testimony that the deed was a gift 
for services gratuitously rendered in connection with 
checking some oil leases or oil stock, and for which de-
fendant Center never intended to charge, never rendered 
a bill, never made any claim, but piously "hoped" for 
something in return clearly fits in with the testimony 
Inade on his own behalf that the doctor treated him 
(Center) as 'a son, insofar as charging him in connection 
with medical services rendered-makes it all too clear 
and obvious that checking the items for the doctor was 
only a favor for past favors, and, clearly not an enter-
prise of great moment for which compensation could 
be garnered. It is all too clear that the doctor in giving 
him an advantageous position in fixing medical fees-
would not certainly feel obligated to compensate him 
handsomely for a mere inquiry into the status of some 
oil investments. The contention of Center that the lots 
were given to him, for a prior transaction, is all too 
clearly ,a mere plausible attempt to hold onto the lots, 
and divide the value with the tax title claimant, Alliance 
Realty and Building Company, with whom he has teamed 
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up. It is clear, too, that Dr. Edwards without reference 
to Center's violation of hi::; agreement, was clear and 
positive about the transaction, and the details thereof, 
and, the plaintiff here as his assignee stands in the same 
relative and unin1peachable position. All of the physical 
£acts, lack of interest by Center, non-payment of taxes, 
non-user, non-concern about the lots, corroborate the 
plaintiff's position. Certainly, if Center's claim was sub-
stantial as to these lots, he wouldn't have to concede 
four-fifths of the interest to the defendant Alliance 
Realty and Building Company, he could quiet the title 
against the void tax deed in himself. The plaintiff's 
evidence is clear, convincing, and decisive, and warranted 
submission to the Court, sitting as a chancellor, of the 
meritoriousness of his claim for rescission. 
(B) The law on the quantum of proof to be supplied. 
At the outset, we are confronted with the general 
rule that parol evidence to vary the terms, conditions, or 
purposes of a writing may not be introduced, in the 
absence of a claim of fraud, mistake, or the like. The 
Utah rule is in accord. See Fox Film Corp'n vs. Ogden 
Theater Co., Inc., (1932) 17 Pacific 2nd, 294, 82 Utah 
279, 90 A.L.R. 1299, where the court says at page 296 
Pacific: 
"(1) In the absence of fraud or mistake, a 
conclusive rule to the effect that parol evidence 
is not admissible to vary, add to, or subtract 
from the terms of a valid written instrument is 
generally applied in cases of this kind * * • '' 
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See also, Starley vs. Deseret Foods Corp'n et al (1938) 
74 Pacific 2nd 1221, 43 Utah 577, at page 1223 Pacific: 
'' ( 1) In the absence of fraud, duress, or 
oppression, parol evidence will not be received 
to explain or modify an instrument, unless there 
is something on the face thereof, or in the lan-
guage or signature creating an ambiguity or 
uncertainty * * * ". 
Plaintiff here, is within the rule, since the contention is 
that failure to follow out the agreement was premedi-
tated, and immediate as shown by recording the deed 
within four days after obtaining it, and therefore fraudu-
lent. 
True, the burden of proof is upon the party assert-
ing the fraudulent conduct, and ordinarily it must be 
proven by the preponderance of the evidence. See sec-
tion 531 and 532, (page 730) .Abbott on Facts, 5th Edition 
(Viesselman); 2 Jones Commentaries on Evidence, 2nd 
Edition, Sections 546, 547, pages 1003-4; 24 .American 
Jurisprudence, Fraud and Deceit, Sections 278, 279, and 
this rule is well stated in the Utah case of Lane vs. Peter-
son (1926) 251 Pacific 374, 68 Utah 585, at page 379 
Pacific: 
'' * • * It is a well established rule of law that 
fraud is never presumed, that when a transaction 
is explainable upon the theory of honesty and 
fair dealing that theory will be adopted, 'unless 
the evidence clearly preponderates in favor of 
the illegal aspect of the transaction' * • • , 
'the burden of. proving the alleged fraud must 
be established by clear and convincing evidence'. 
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Again, in X elson v~. Leamington .Jl ines & Explora-
tion Co., (1935) 48 Pacific 2nd 439, 87 Utah 69, at page 
440 Pacific the court ~tates: 
"(1) ~ * " ·in order to establish a charge of 
this character, the complainant must show by 
clear and decisive proof * '~ * ' 
However, despite the preponderance of the evidence 
rule, there are a great Inany expressions, such as clear 
preponderance, clear and convincing evidence, and the 
like, as set out in Section 278, 24 American Jurispru-
dence, Title Fraud and Deceit, but, the variation in 
language seems to be explainable upon grounds that, 
" * * * perhaps the use of such descriptive 
expressions in stating the required proof of 
fraud in a civil case does no more than indicate 
an approval of the proposition that fraud 
cannot be founded upon doubtful, vague, uncer-
tain, and inconclusive evidence, or upon mere 
suspicion or conjecture * * * The use of such 
expressions in every case has been attributed to 
the fact that fraud must ordinarily be proved by 
circumstantial evidence, and it has been suggested 
that the variations in the expressions used by 
the different courts indicate ,a view of what 
constitutes a burden of evidence rather than 
disagreement with the general rule that a pre-
ponderance of the evidence is sufficient to estab-
lish fraud in a civil case * * * "-24 Am. J ur., 
Section 278, Fraud & Deceit. 
(C) Enough evidence was produced to make an 
issu,e and require submission to the Court 
sitting as a chancellor. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
It has been stated (64 Corpus Juris 301, Section 
317 (2), page 301) 
"That the legal sufficiency of the evidence 
to take the case to the jury (or the chancellor in 
this case) is a question of law. * * * The ques-
tion for the court is not whether there is literally 
no evidence, but whether there is no evidence 
which ought reasonably to satisfy the jury (or 
chancellor) that the fact is established. In de-
termining the question, the evidence as a whole 
for the party having the burden of proof must 
be looked to, and that construction of the evi-
dence most favorable to the party introducing 
it should be adopted with all reasonable infer-
ences favorable to such party being drawn from 
it * * * " 
When the Court made its decision in this cause, 
there was still before it (Rec. 90) defendants' motion 
to dismiss. In determining the latter, which is similar 
to a motion of non-suit, the following construction of 
evidence should be taken : 
'' (a) Assumption-The Court in passing up-
on the legal sufficiency of the evidence must as-
sume the truth of the statements offered or made. 
* * * 
(c) Duty (1) It is the duty of the Court to 
decide as a preliminary question (legal), whether 
there is any evidence legally sufficient to be con-
sidered by the jury. * * * 
(2) It is the duty of the trial 
Court, giving to the evidence the most favorable 
interpretation toward the party against whom 
the motion is directed, to ·determine whether 
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there are any faet~ of the eYidence tending to 
support plaintiff's right to recover. 
(3) \Yhen the testimony is before 
the Court, it i::; its duty to see that it has at 
lea8t a natural tendency to sustain the allega-
tions, and to warrant an inference of the fact 
to be proved, and if there is no sufficient evi-
dence to justify an inference of the disputed 
fact, it should be withheld from the jury.'' 
X ote 94a to Section 317, 64 Corpus Juris, 301. 
Construing the e\Tidence introduced in this cause 
by the plaintiff, in the light of the above rules, c~r­
tainly there is a sufficient showing, taking the plain-
tiff's testimony in the most favorable light, to support 
his right of recovery, and he has sustained the burden 
of the evidence. Such is the Utah rule : 
'' (1) In determining the propriety of grant-
ing a motion for involuntary non-suit the evi-
dence must be considered from a view most 
favorable to the party against whom the dismis-
sal is sought * * * " Page 432, Utah Reports, 
Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York vs. Middle-
miss, 103 Utah 429, 135 Pac. 2nd 275, and 
"(1) The question for determination in this 
case is whether the trial court erred in granting 
the motion for non-suit. To decide this question 
we must view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff. If plaintiff established 
by sufficient competent evidence each of the 
essential elements of his alleged cause of action 
to make out a prima facie case of liability, the 
court erred in non-suiting the plaintiff. If not 
the judgment should be affirmed * * * '' - Page 
510, Utah Reports, Oberg vs. Sanders (1947), 
184 Pac. 2nd 229, 111 Utah 507. 
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It is submitted, that viewed in this light, the Court 
sitting as chancellor was required to pass on and de-
cide on the preponderance of the evidence--a question 
such as would go to the jury, or the court sitting 
without a jury, or as chancellor, not as he did as a 
preliminary question, but on the merits of the case. 
Preponderance of the evidence as defined in Wilkin-
son vs. Anderson-Taylor Company, (1904), 79 Pac. 46 
28 Utah 346 is: 
''By preponderance of the evidence is meant 
the greatest weight of the evidence, that which 
is more convincing as to its truth. It is not 
necessarily determined by the number of wit-
nesses for or against a proposition, although 
other things being equal it may be so deter-
mined '" * * ". 
(D) The Court's Decision Af!irma1tively Shows 
a Sufficiency of Evidence to Warrant a De-
cision on the Merits. 
That the trial court sitting as a chancellor should 
have considered the matter on the merits is clearly 
shown from this statement in summation on page 108 
of the record : 
''The Court is of this view, that the testimony 
of the plaintiff shows, if it is true, that the 
man Center did not receive the property, did 
not pay the taxes; that he has given up his inter-
est; that there is an ;adverse interest, that he 
has paid nothing for the property, except ren-
dered a service for which he expected no pay; 
it was not a legal obligation. 
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• • The Court is of the op1n1on that legally 
that is not sufficient; and so, that there is 
clear and convincing evidence that this deed 
should be set aside and declared to be an instru-
ment of agency. 
"~ow the Court is ruling on this as a legal 
matter; not on a question of fact; and if the 
Court is in error, you can appeal it on that 
ground; * * * '' 
Certainly, if the Court on the assumption of the evi-
dence as above could so hold, then, it had the manifest 
duty of deciding the issue on the merits, not on the 
ground of failure to sustain the burden of proof, or 
insufficieny of the evidence to go to the Court or jury. 
And, to hold to the theory that clear and convinc-
ing proof, or clear and precise proof, changes the 
preponderance of the evidence rule, or requires the 
compliance with the so-called numerical witness rule, 
of at least two witnesses, would be to deny, in every 
case, to parties who had advantage taken of them by 
another, without benefit of witnesses, any relief what-
soever, no matter how great a fraud or imposition may 
have been practiced or perpetrated upon them. That 
such is not an absolute rule, see: 
Pender vs. Cook (1930), 150 Atlantic 892, 300 Penn-
sylvania 468, where it is said, at page 894: 
"(5-6) Parol evidence to change, affect, or 
lessen the legal liability caused by the manner 
in which the names are placed on commercial 
paper can be considered only where fraud, acci-
dent, or mistake is shown, and must be of the 
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same quality as that which would reform a 
written instrument; that is, the evidence must 
be clear, precise, and indubitable, established by 
two witnesses, or by one witness and corroborat-
ing circumstamces." 
and, again in Mitchell vs. First National Bank of Con-
fluence (1939), 7 At1antic 2d, 511, 135 Pennsylvania 
Superior 519, where the statement is made that it is 
sufficient if: 
'' ( 6-8) * * * resting upon the testimony of 
one supported, as in this case, by corroborating 
circumstances * * * ". 
See VII Wigmore on Evidence 3rd Edition 259, 
Section 2034 ( 2), that : 
''In general, the testimony of a single wit-
ness no matter what the issue or who the per-
son, may legally suffice as evidence on which 
the jury may find a verdict.'' 
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CONCLUSION 
It was error to leave the plaintiff and appellant 
remediless, and deprive him of the fruits of a decision 
on the merib, on the weight of the evidence, by a 
holding that he had failed to sustain the burden of 
carrying the evidence. 
'VHEREFORE, plaintiff and appellant prays this 
Honorable Court to reverse the holding of the trial 
Court, and re1nand the same for further proceedings 
in accordance "ith the principles contended for herein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MILTON V. BACKMAN of 
BACKMAN, BACKMAN & CLARK, 
.Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
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